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Fraser Duncan*  Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case
 for the False Light Tort in Canada
The false light tort has been the most contentious of the four privacy torts recognized 
in many US states, receiving criticism for its uncertain connection to privacy interests, 
its overlap with defamation and its chilling effect on free speech. While the tort has not 
previously received much judicial or scholarly attention in Canada, the recent decision 
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Yenovkian v Gulian recognized false light 
as a cause of action in the province. This article cautions other Canadian common law 
courts against following suit through an analysis of the nature, history, and criticisms 
of the tort in the US. Although a narrow version of the tort could differentiate the action 
from defamation, the privacy interests protected may not be sufficiently widespread 
and significant enough to warrant extending the common law. Furthermore, the chilling 
effect on freedom of speech cannot be discounted.
Le délit consistant à présenter une personne sous un faux jour a été considéré comme 
le plus controversé des quatre délits contre la vie privée reconnus dans de nombreux 
États américains, recevant des critiques pour son lien incertain avec le droit au respect 
de la vie privée, son chevauchement avec la diffamation et son effet paralysant sur la 
liberté d’expression. Bien que ce délit n’ait pas reçu beaucoup d’attention judiciaire 
ou académique au Canada, la récente décision de la Cour supérieure de justice 
de l’Ontario dans l’affaire Yenovkian c. Gulian a reconnu que la présentation d’une 
personne sous un faux jour constitue une cause d’action dans la province. Dans le 
présent article, nous mettons en garde les autres tribunaux canadiens de common law 
contre la possibilité de donner suite à cette décision en analysant la nature, l’histoire et 
les critiques de ce type de délit aux États-Unis. Bien qu’une interprétation plus étroite 
du délit puisse le différencier de la diffamation, le droit au respect de la vie privée ainsi 
protégé peut ne pas être suffisamment étendu et important pour justifier l’extension de 
la common law. En outre, l’effet dissuasif sur la liberté d’expression ne peut être écarté.
* MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Glasgow), JD (University of Saskatchewan). I would like 
to thank Professor Barbara von Tigerstrom for her encouragement and advice as well as the two 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. 
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In a “world without privacy, or at least a world in which the meaning 
of privacy is radically transformed both as a legal idea and a lived 
reality,”1 common law courts could play a vital role in providing greater 
protection for individuals’ privacy rights. Other Commonwealth countries 
offer limited guidance about the potential merits of judicial innovation. 
English courts have rejected a general tort of invasion of privacy2 and 
have instead relied on a modified breach of confidence action to protect 
1. Austin Sarat, “Whither Privacy? An Introduction” in Austin Sarat, ed, A World Without Privacy: 
What Law Can and Should Do? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 1 at 1. 
2. Wainwright	v	Home	Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 35.
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against unwanted disclosures.3 The recent experience of New Zealand has 
more relevance,4 but the privacy torts adopted there are “still in [their] 
infancy”5 and the caselaw is limited.6 Instead, the obvious example of a 
country that has developed novel privacy torts is the US where, in many 
states, four discrete privacy actions (intrusion upon seclusion, public 
disclosure of private facts, false light, appropriation) have been available 
for decades. Indeed, courts in the common law world have drawn heavily 
on US jurisprudence when considering novel privacy torts.7 
The latest Canadian example of US influence on the development of 
privacy torts is Yenovkian v Gulian, decided in December 2019, in which 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized false light as a cause of 
action.8 Until Yenovkian, the false light tort had neither received much 
attention from Canadian courts nor from Canadian legal scholars. The 
tort provides a cause of action when a plaintiff has been placed in a false 
light before the public if this representation was “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person” and if the defendant had “knowledge of or acted in 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false 
light in which the other would be placed.”9  The false representation 
in question may defame the plaintiff but does not need to: the critical 
question is whether the representation amounts to a highly offensive 
one.10 False light also differs from defamation by protecting privacy 
interests rather than reputation, although this point is contested. False light 
has been the most controversial of the four American privacy torts: the 
action’s similarity to defamation has been a focal point of criticism in the 
US and offers a possible explanation for the limited Canadian discussion 
3. Campbell v MGN, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457.
4. The New Zealand Court of Appeal recognized the tort of public disclosure of private facts in 
Hosking v Runting, [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 [Hosking] while the New Zealand High Court 
adopted intrusion upon seclusion in C v Holland, [2012] NZHC 2155 [Holland].
5. Siemer v Spartan News Ltd, [2014] NZHC 3175 at para 151 [Siemer].
6. This is particularly true of the intrusion upon seclusion tort as no other claim on this basis 
appears to have succeeded. The High Court of New Zealand held that a police search pursuant to a 
lawful warrant did not cause an intrusion upon seclusion in Siemer, supra note 5 at para 152 while it 
also dismissed an action in Henderson v Slevin, [2015] NZHC 366 at paras 69, 71 as the claim failed to 
demonstrate an area of seclusion and the defendants’ actions were not highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. In Duval v Clift, [2014] NZHC 1950 at para 104, the claim for intrusion upon seclusion was 
judged to be of no merit with little discussion of the cause of action. In Faesenkloet v Jenkin, [2014] 
NZHC 1637 at paras 38, 53 Justice Asher questioned whether two distinct privacy torts were required, 
framing his analysis instead around the tort of invasion of privacy.
7. See eg Hosking, supra note 4; Holland, supra note 4; Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 [Jones]; 
Doe 464533 v ND, 2016 ONSC 541 [Doe].
8. 2019 ONSC 7279 [Yenovkian].
9. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 652E (1977) [Restatement].
10. Ibid § 652D.
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of the tort’s utility. Nonetheless, the decision in Yenovkian confirms the 
recent Ontario trend of judicial openness to novel privacy torts following 
the earlier recognition of intrusion upon seclusion in Jones11 and public 
disclosure of private facts in Doe.12 Whether this trend extends beyond 
Ontario remains to be seen. There are, however, some hints that, post-
Jones, other Canadian jurisdictions may follow the Ontario example.13
This article considers whether the false light tort should be imported 
into Canada, following the decision in Yenovkian, through an assessment 
of its value as a cause of action in the US. The first section outlines the 
different development of the protection of privacy in the common law in 
the US and Canada while the second section elaborates on the elements of 
the false light action. The third section explores the history of the tort in the 
US, highlighting its checkered history. This section also underscores the 
importance of the broader context of changes in US defamation law to the 
tort’s growth. The following three sections explore the most substantive 
criticisms of the action: uncertainty as to the interests protected by the 
tort, its viability as an independent cause of action, and its alleged chilling 
effect on freedom of speech. Some of the problems with false light can 
be avoided by adopting a narrower version of the tort that only provides 
relief for non-defamatory statements about an individual that infringe 
on their privacy rights. However, questions remain about whether the 
privacy interests protected by this constrained version of false light are 
sufficiently widespread and significant enough to require protection under 
the common law. Moreover, despite significant differences between the 
Canadian and American approaches to free speech, the chilling argument 
cannot be ignored. For these reasons, it is not recommended that Canadian 
courts adopt the false light action.
I. Common law protection of privacy in the US and Canada
Invasion of privacy has long been recognized in the US as actionable in 
tort law. Following the famous call by Warren Brandeis and Louis Brandeis 
11. Jones, supra note 7.
12. Doe, supra note 7.
13. See eg VonMaltzahn v Koppernaes, 2018 NSSC 192 at paras 48-51 (finding that the defendant 
had invaded the plaintiff’s privacy); Carbone v Burnett, 2019 ABQB 98 at paras 46-47 (finding that 
the elements of intrusion upon seclusion had been not made out but not expressly rejecting the tort’s 
availability in Alberta); Grant v Winnipeg Regional Health Authority et al, 2015 MBCA 44 at para 126 
(acknowledging the hypothetical possibility of a claim for intrusion upon seclusion and/or false light 
in Manitoba); Hynes v Western Regional Integrated Health Authority, 2014 NLTD(G) 137 at para 25 
(acknowledging that Newfoundland and Labrador privacy legislation does not exhaustively occupy 
the field and preclude common law privacy torts). Contra Ari v Insurance Corporation of British 
Columbia, 2013 BCSC 1308 at para 63 (confirming that there was no tort of invasion or breach or 
privacy in British Columbia).
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in 1890 for the common law to protect the right to be let alone,14 courts 
across the country began to recognize tortious invasions of privacy so that 
“[b]y 1960, a large number of cases had been decided under the auspices 
of the emerging privacy doctrine.”15 William Prosser’s celebrated 1960 
article attempted to provide greater structure to this doctrine.16 His survey 
of the emerging case law in this area led him to identify four discrete tort 
actions protecting privacy: intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion, public 
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff, publicity that places 
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and appropriation of the 
plaintiff’s name for the defendant’s advantage. Prosser’s classification, 
later adopted in the Restatement,17 has “proved highly persuasive to states, 
lawmakers, and judges and has become the modern framework for the 
privacy tort in the United States.”18 Not all US jurisdictions recognize 
each of the four torts,19 but Prosser’s work continues to be the starting 
point for judicial consideration of the validity and extent of tort actions for 
privacy infringements.20   
Unlike their counterparts in the US, Canadian courts have traditionally 
been resistant to attempts to extend the common law to provide a distinct 
tort action for invasions of privacy.21 Other causes of action, such as 
trespass to land and defamation, potentially offer some protection 
against such intrusions,22 but the prospect of a remedy hinges wholly 
on the specific facts in any given case.23 Some protection, both in the 
common law and in statute, is available to prevent the misappropriation 
of personality.24 Moreover, statutory torts of invasion of privacy exist in 
14. “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harvard L Rev 193.
15. Gary T Schwartz, “Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy” 
(1991) 41:3 Case W Res L Rev 885 at 885.
16. William L Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48:3 Cal L Rev 383.
17. Restatement, supra note 9.
18. Paul M Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, “Prosser’s ‘Privacy’ and the German Right of 
Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?” (2010) 98:6 Cal L Rev 1925 
at 1938.
19. See Section III-3, below.
20. See eg the judgments in Denver Pub Co v Bueno, 54 P (3d) 893 (Colo Sup Ct 2002) [Bueno], 
Jews For Jesus, Inc v Rapp, 997 So (2d) 1098 at 1109 (Fla Sup Ct 2008) [Rapp] and West v Media 
General Convergence, Inc, 53 SW (3d) 640 at 645-646 (Tenn Sup Ct 2001) [West]. 
21. Chris DL Hunt, “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2011) 37:1 Queen’s LJ 167 
at 168 [Hunt, “Conceptualizing”]. 
22. John DR Craig, “Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens” 
(1997) 42:2 McGill LJ 355 at 366.
23. See eg the discussion in Chris DL Hunt, “The Common Law’s Hodgepodge Protection of 
Privacy” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 161 at 164-179.
24. Amy M Conroy, “Protecting Your Personality Rights in Canada: A Matter of Property or 
Privacy?” (2012) 1 Western J Leg Studies 3.
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some of the common law provinces (Saskatchewan,25 British Columbia,26 
Manitoba,27 and Newfoundland and Labrador28). However, there are strong 
grounds to doubt their effectiveness.29 The general picture is of limited and 
inconsistent privacy protection in the common law in Canada. There is 
therefore a gap in privacy protection in Canadian law and common law 
privacy torts may offer one way to rectify this. 
Recent decisions in Ontario that have explicitly borrowed from US 
jurisprudence suggest a possible change of direction. In Jones, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal recognized an action for intrusion upon seclusion,30 
while the Ontario Superior Court adopted the tort of public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts in Doe.31 Although the precedential value of the 
latter is questionable,32 the two decisions together seem to indicate a greater 
judicial willingness, in one province at least, to reconsider whether tort 
law can play a role in defending individual privacy with some observers.  
Until 2019, only three of Prosser’s torts had been relevant in 
Canada. The false light tort, by contrast, had been largely ignored. 
Judicial consideration in Canada of the merits of the false light tort has 
been extremely limited.33 A false light claim was rejected by the Court 
of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba in Parasuik v Canadian Newspapers Co 
25. The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24.
26. Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373.
27. The Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P125.
28. Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22.
29. A 2003 review of claims under the various provincial privacy statutes highlighted the limited 
success of plaintiffs and the modest damages awarded in successful claims: see Simon Chester, Jason 
Murphy & Eric Robb, “Zapping the Paparazzi: Is the Tort of Privacy Alive and Well?” (2003) 27:4 
Adv Q 357 at 359. See also David H Flaherty, “Some Reflections on Privacy and Technology” (1998) 
26:2 Man LJ 219 at 222. The Privacy Act in Saskatchewan, supra note 25, for example, reflects 
the prevalent concerns (eg wiretapping) at the time of its creation and is arguably unsuited to meet 
the challenges posed by contemporary information and communications technology. The hope of its 
drafters that its vague provisions would be developed and elaborated by the courts has not been borne 
out in practice. Indeed, from 1972, the year of its adoption, until 2012, there was only one reported 
decision under the Saskatchewan Privacy Act (Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Renewing 
the Privacy Act, Final Report (2012) at 3, 22, online (pdf): <https://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/
Renewing_the_Privacy_Act_Final_Report.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2UEJ-VUMU]).
30. Jones, supra note 7.
31. Doe, supra note 7. 
32. It was a lower court decision with multiple causes of action that was subsequently reversed on 
procedural grounds in Jane Doe 464533 v ND, 2016 ONSC 4920.
33. A Quicklaw search for the Boolean term “false light” uncovered only thirty-nine Canadian cases 
(counting appeals of a lower court judgment separately), of which twelve were judgments that used 
the term in a more generic sense. Four cases, mentioned in the text, considered the false light claim in 
some detail, a further six involved preliminary decisions allowing or striking a claim without extensive 
consideration of the validity of the action, and one referred to a tort claim in the US. The remaining 
sixteen cases quoted Prosser’s categorization without specifically commenting on the existence of a 
false light tort.
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as having no foundation in either statute or the common law.34  Both the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia35 and the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice36 had rejected false light claims on the facts while not definitively 
ruling out the existence of the tort. 
Similarly, there has been little academic discussion of the applicability 
of false light in the Canadian context. In a short footnote in a recent 
article, Chris DL Hunt rejects the adoption of the tort, arguing the interest 
protected is reputation, not privacy, and that there is too much overlap 
with defamation.37 John DR Craig, too, dismisses the tort in the Canadian 
context because the element of falsity clouds the privacy interests at stake. 
He argues that such actions are more appropriately treated as defamation 
actions if the reputation of the plaintiff is damaged, or as public disclosure 
of embarrassing facts actions if the defendant’s publicity impinges on the 
right to be let alone.38 Beyond this, however, few Canadian scholars have 
assessed the utility of the tort.39 
The false light tort has been the most contentious of Prosser’s four 
torts40 with many critics denying its relevance to the protection of privacy,41 
decrying its impact on free speech,42 and attacking its application by 
courts.43 The tort has been variously labelled  “conceptually empty,”44 
“amorphous,”45 and also “over-grown.”46 False light also seems intrinsically 
linked to the American context, specifically the stringent restrictions on 
defamation actions, as the action provides a potential means to circumvent 
these limitations.47 Given the significance of this context and the repeated 
interrogations of the tort’s legitimacy in its native jurisdictional habitat, 
false light may not be the most obvious candidate for importation. 
34. [1988] 53 Man R (2d) 78 at 80, 2 WWR 737. 
35. Silber v British Columbia Television Broadcasting System Ltd (1985), 25 DLR (4th) 345 at 354-
355, 2 WWR 609.
36. Chandra v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2015 ONSC 5303 at para 44.
37. Hunt, “Conceptualizing,” supra note 21 at 175, n 27.
38. Craig, supra note 22 at 382-383.
39. Other exceptions include a short positive assessment in HJ Glasbeek, “Outraged Dignity—Do 
We Need a New Tort?” (1968) 6:1 Alta L Rev 77 at 79 and a one-sentence rejection of the tort as 
overlapping with defamation in Russell Brown, “Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation 
and Tort Law” (2006) 43:3 Alta L Rev 589 at 593. 
40. Lake v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 582 NW (2d) 231 at 235 (Minn Sup Ct 1998) [Wal-Mart].
41. Bruce A McKenna, “False Light: Invasion of Privacy” 15 Tulsa LJ 113 at 126.
42. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed” (1989) 
64:2 NYUL Rev 364 at 435-451.
43. J Clark Kelso, “False Light Privacy: A Requiem” (1992) 32:3 Santa Clara L Rev 783 at 819.
44. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 369.
45. Bueno, supra note 20 at 904.
46. Schwartz, supra note 15 at 918.
47. See Sections  IV–VI, below.
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Nonetheless, the decision in Yenovkian has, at least for the time being, 
introduced the action into Ontario, confirming earlier speculation that all 
of Prosser’s privacy torts would eventually be recognized in the province.48
Justice Kristjanson’s judgment in Yenovkian provides a relatively 
short justification for recognizing false light.49 The distinct interest 
the action protects is “a person’s privacy right to control the way they 
present themselves to the world.”50 According to the Restatement, the 
misrepresentation may be defamatory but does not need to be.51 Justice 
Kristjanson also acknowledges the overlap with the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts, both in the shared elements of each action52 (ie publicity 
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person) and in practice.53 However, 
false light should be recognized as:
[i]t follows that one who subjects another to highly offensive publicity 
can be held responsible whether the publicity is true or false. This indeed, 
is precisely why the tort of publicity placing a person [in] a false light 
should be recognized. It would be absurd if a defendant could escape 
liability for invasion of privacy simply because the statements they have 
made about another person are false.54 
There is no reference to the debate within US jurisprudence and American 
legal scholarship regarding the value of the tort. Admittedly, Yenovkian 
may not have been an ideal case for such a discussion given the range of 
orders and causes of action involved. The case arose from an exceptionally 
acrimonious family law dispute in which the applicant father was found 
to have engaged in “outrageous and egregious conduct at the extreme 
of reprehensibility.”55 The applicant father was subject to a permanent 
restraining order56 and an order for child and spousal support, with sole 
custody awarded to the mother.57 The father was, inter alia, also ordered 
to pay damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, invasion 
of privacy (both false light and public disclosure of private facts), and 
punitive damages.58 Nonetheless, judicial innovation in extending the 
48. Stephen Aylward, “The Idea of Privacy Law: Jones v Tsige and the Limits of the Common Law” 
(2013) 71:1 UT Fac L Rev 61 at 71. Such speculation was based on the fact that Justice Sharpe had 
appeared in Jones to embrace the entire Prosser framework (Jones, supra note 7 at para 21).
49. Yenovkian, supra note 8 at paras 170-174.
50. Ibid at para 171.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid at para 172.
53. Ibid at para 174.
54. Ibid at para 173.
55. Ibid at para 197.
56. Ibid at para 48.
57. Ibid at para 206.
58. Ibid.
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common law should be careful and considered. Before other Canadian 
courts choose to follow the decision in Yenovkian, it is vital to scrutinize 
the nature, history, and criticisms of the tort in the US. 
II. An analysis of the false light tort
1. The elements of a false light action
a. Publicity
While the elements of false light bear some similarities with defamation, 
one difference is the degree to which the defendant must have disseminated 
the falsehood. Defamation under US tort law requires publication; 
“widespread publicity” (but not necessarily publication) has been held to 
be “an essential ingredient to any false light invasion of privacy claim.”59 
The difference between publication and publicity has been described in the 
following way:
‘Publication,’…includes any communication by the defendant to a third 
person. ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the matter is made 
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons 
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become 
one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of 
communication…It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to 
reach, the public.60
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Gary 
v Crouch, publicity is clearly a higher threshold than publication.61 
Information communicated to a single individual or a small group of 
people will not suffice. For example, publicity has been held not to have 
occurred when an investigative report has been handed over to a person 
who initiated the investigation with an instruction to keep it confidential,62 
nor when information alleging the plaintiff had misappropriated company 
property is passed on to a small number of individuals at a corporation 
and a government agency.63 The publicity requirement, by contrast, 
will be satisfied by publication of the alleged falsehood in a newspaper 
or magazine and by broadcast on television or radio.64 Publicity might 
also mean dissemination of material not to the public at large but to a 
59. Crump v Beckley Newspapers, Inc, 320 SE (2d) 70 at 88 (W Va Supp Ct App 1984) [Crump].
60. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652D.
61. 867 So (2d) 310 at 318, n 6 (Ala Sup Ct 2003).
62. Johnston v Fuller, 706 So (2d) 700 at 5 (Ala Sup Ct 1997).
63. Freeman v Unisys Corp, 870 F Supp 169 at 12 (ED Mich 1994). 
64. Richard E Kaye, Causes of Action, vol 33, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2007) (WL).
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sufficiently large number of people, such as a letter sent to over 3,500 
households as in Parnigoni v St. Columbia’s Nursery School.65
In some jurisdictions, an exception has been made to the “widespread” 
condition for publicity where the communication is to an individual with 
whom the plaintiff has a special relationship.66 However, despite being 
cited elsewhere,67 the continuing validity of this exception is uncertain and 
another, more recent Illinois district court chose to follow Seventh Circuit 
precedent in adopting the much more demanding publicity standard 
applied elsewhere.68
b. Falsehood
False light is set apart from the other privacy torts as it requires the 
communication of a falsehood about the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to 
prove the false nature of the statement.69 The falsehood can be defamatory 
but need not be.70 The falsehood may take the form of a false description 
of the plaintiff, a statement falsely attributed to the plaintiff, an incorrect 
identification of the plaintiff as the subject of a photograph or a false 
implication about the plaintiff’s character, proclivities or endorsement.71 
Linked to the requirement that the falsity publicized be highly offensive 
to the reasonable person, minor inaccuracies will not incur liability.72 For 
instance, the Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected an exotic dancer’s 
false light claim against a magazine publisher and a private club for 
an advertisement featuring a picture of her on the basis that the only 
inaccuracies contained within it were the dancer’s stage name and the false 
implication that the dancer worked at the club being advertised.73 A plaintiff 
will also not be allowed to recover when the claim centres on information 
they argue should have been included along with the original material 
communicated so long as the information publicized is “substantially 
true.”74  Where, however, the defendant creates “a false impression by 
knowingly or recklessly publicizing selective pieces of true information,”75 
the plaintiff can prove falsity. Finally, due to the constitutional protection 
65. 681 F Supp (2d) 1 at 19 (DDC 2010).
66. Poulos v Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Inc, 728 NE (2d) 547 at 555 (Ill App 1 Dist 2000). 
67. Duncan v Peterson, 835 NE (2d) 411 at 423-424 (Ill App 2 Dist 2005).
68. Davis v Jewish Vocational Service, 2010 WL 1172537 (ND Ill).
69. Kaye, supra note 64.
70. David A Elder, The Law of Privacy (Deerfield, IL: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991) at 262.
71. Kaye, supra note 64.
72. Rinsley v Brandt, 700 F 2d 1304 at 1308 (10th Cir 2003).
73. Cabaniss v Hipsley, 151 SE 2d 496 at 503 (Ga App Ct 1966).
74. Goodrich v Waterbury Republican-American, Inc, 448 A (2d) 1317 at 1331 (Conn Sup Ct 1982).
75. Santillo v Reedel, 634 A 2d 264 at 267 (Pa Sup Ct 1993).
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of opinions,76 a false light action will not succeed where the defendant’s 
representation is deemed by the court to qualify as an opinion.77
c.	 Identification	of	the	plaintiff
The information publicized must be “concerning the other that places the 
other in a false light.”78 Thus, the plaintiff must be clearly identifiable in 
the defendant’s representation. The plaintiff need not be named by the 
defendant,79 and defendants may still attract liability despite a disclaimer 
that a piece of work is fiction.80 If the plaintiff is a member of a group 
that is being placed in a false light, then a false light claim, following the 
precedent set in defamation actions, will only succeed if the group is “so 
small that the publicity can reasonably be understood as referring to that 
individual”81 or if “the plaintiff can show that the circumstances of the 
publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is a particular 
reference to the plaintiff.”82 While courts have generally borrowed the 
framework for identification from defamation actions, Elder points to one 
clear exception.83 Due to the difference between publication and publicity, 
false light claims require that the plaintiff be identifiable to a wider group 
of people beyond the plaintiff’s “small group of intimates.”84   
d.	 Highly	offensive	to	the	reasonable	person
False light, like public disclosure of private facts, requires that the 
infringement of privacy be highly offensive to the reasonable person. The 
highly offensive requirement sets a threshold for the imposition of liability 
so that a false light action will not be successful “for the publication of 
information [is] so innocuous that notice of potential harm would not be 
present.”85 This is an objective standard: unusually sensitive plaintiffs will 
not be granted relief.86 Kaye provides a series of illustrative categories 
based on cases in which the highly offensive standard was satisfied. These 
include where the plaintiff is described in crude and vulgar terms, where 
76. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323 (1974) at 339-340 [Gertz].
77. Cibenko v Worth Publishers, Inc, 510 F Supp 761 at 766 (D NJ 1981).
78. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652E.
79. In MG v Time Warner, Inc, 89 Cal App 4th 623 (2001), a Sports Illustrated story about sexual 
abuse by coaches in youth sport used a team photograph of a Little League team to illustrate the story. 
None of the plaintiffs were named, but the California Court of Appeal, affirming a lower court’s denial 
of the defendant’s motion to strike the complaint, found the plaintiffs had a viable claim.  
80. Muzikowski v Paramount Pictures Corp, 322 F 3d 918 at 927 (7th Cir 2003).
81. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v CBS News, 485 F Supp. 893 at 904 (WD Mich 1980)
82. Diaz v NBC Universal, Inc, 337 F App’x 94 at 96 (2d Cir 2009).
83. Elder, supra note 70 at 280.
84. Brauer v Globe Newspaper Co, 217 NE (2d) 736 at 740 (Mass Sup Jud Ct 1966). 
85. Crump, supra note 59 at 90. 
86. Godbehere v Phoenix Newspapers, Inc, 783 P2d 781 at 786 (Ariz Sup Ct 1989). 
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the plaintiff’s professional reputation has been impugned by a falsehood, 
where the plaintiff’s photo or name has been published in a sexually 
explicit magazine, or where the defendant’s representation implies that 
the plaintiff is a liar, has been unfaithful to their sexual partner, or has 
committed criminal offences.87
e. Knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity
The requirement of knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity in 
the Restatement’s definition reflects the extension to false light of the 
constitutional protection provided to free speech in defamation actions.88 
In the wake of Gertz,89 it is likely that that this constitutionally required 
standard of fault, the “actual malice” standard, does not apply when the 
plaintiff is a private individual and not a public figure. Gertz established 
that states could set a lower level of fault (ie negligence) for defamation 
claims by private individuals provided there was no strict liability.90 The 
Restatement takes a cautious approach as to whether a false light action 
can be based on the defendant’s negligent falsehood.91 However, a number 
of states have adopted this lower fault requirement.92
2. Defences
The defences for false light actions effectively mirror those available in 
defamation suits. The Restatement makes clear that absolute privilege 
defences available in defamation actions also apply fully to the privacy 
torts.93 Thus, an untruthful statement made during the middle of a judicial 
proceeding could not be the basis for a false light claim. Consent is included 
in the absolute privilege defences: as long as the disputed publicity does 
not exceed the scope of the prior consent, it provides a full defence.94 
Similarly, conditional privilege defences are wholly imported from 
defamation actions.95 A defendant is therefore able to take reasonable steps 
in the protection of his or her own interests, to communicate matters of 
common interest, and to give information to public authorities regarding a 
crime committed or potentially to be committed.96 A defence of conditional 
privilege may be defeated if the information was communicated outside 
87. Kaye, supra note 64.
88. See Section III-2, below.
89. Supra, note 76.
90. Ibid at 347.
91. Supra note 9 at § 652E. 
92. Kaye, supra note 64; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 392, n 173. 
93. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652F.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid at § 652G.
96. Elder, supra note 70 at 313-315.
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the privilege97 or if the plaintiff can show malice or bad faith on the part 
of the defendant.98 Conditional privilege in the context of defamation has 
been less important since the decision in New York Times v Sullivan99 
relocated some of its traditional functions to the constitutional protections 
afforded by the First Amendment.100 
III. The history of the false light tort in the US
1. An inauspicious beginning?
Prosser’s influence in the origins of the false light tort cannot be questioned: 
the term “false light” had not been connected to “privacy” in any reported 
American judgments prior to Prosser’s article, but this changed in the 
following years.101 However, his pioneering work in “finding” the tort has 
been the focal point for criticism. 
Prosser’s identification of false light as one of four privacy torts was 
based on his survey of a number of American cases in which the false 
light concept had, he claimed, gradually crystallised. The first false light 
case, though, according to Prosser was an English one: in Lord Byron v 
Johnston,102 a publisher was prevented from selling a poetry manuscript 
he had falsely claimed had been authored by Lord Byron. Kelso pointedly 
highlights that subsequent cases have treated this as a standard passing off 
action in which Lord Byron sought to prevent the deceptive marketing of 
a good which affected his business interests.103 Prosser’s misreading of this 
case may not have undermined his underlying argument if the remaining 
American case law withstood further scrutiny. Kelso, however, critically 
re-examines each of the cases relied on by Prosser to substantiate his claim 
of increasing “independent recognition” for the false light tort.104 Kelso 
argues that Prosser’s survey involved substantial mischaracterization. 
Regardless of whether the cases are centred on fictitious testimonials in 
advertising, false attribution of books, articles, and ideas to the plaintiff, or 
unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name or picture (including in a rogue’s 
gallery), Kelso argues that the cases were decided on various combinations 
of libel, commercial misappropriation, and unfair competition.105 The 
emergence of a new tort through these decisions was simply “wishful 
97. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 604.
98. Elder, supra note 70 at 315.
99. 376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan].
100. Rodney A Smolla, Law of Defamation (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) (WL).
101. Kelso, supra note 43 at 783.
102. (1816), 2 Mer 28, 35 ER 851 (Ch).
103. Kelso, supra note 43 at 792.
104. Prosser, supra note 16 at 398.
105. Kelso, supra note 43 at 814.
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thinking”106 and “[f]alse light existed only in Prosser’s mind.”107 Other 
critics have been less acerbic while still acknowledging Prosser’s central 
role in identifying the tort.108
Kelso’s forceful critique attacks the very foundation of the false light 
tort and is difficult to reject without replicating his re-examination of cases. 
The problematic beginning of the false light tort need not, however, fatally 
damage the case for it. Prosser may have misrepresented, intentionally 
or otherwise, the evidence for the prior existence of the tort, but this 
problematic justification does not automatically damage other forms of 
justification. In other words, it may be possible to legitimize the tort’s 
existence by other means, for example by reference to a pressing need 
brought about by a gap in the legal protection of privacy. Related to this, 
the initial impetus to recognize an action may be of little significance if 
courts, in practice, find valid, well-considered reasons for its adoption. 
2. The spread and limits of the false light tort
False light quickly found relatively widespread acceptance following the 
publication of Prosser’s article and the tort’s subsequent inclusion in the 
Restatement in 1967.109 However, the spread of the tort has to be viewed 
in the context of the increasing restrictions being placed on defamation 
actions in this period.
In 1964, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan constitutionalized 
the law of libel,110 placing stringent restrictions on the ability of public 
official plaintiffs to recover.111 In such cases, “actual malice,” that is proof 
of either knowledge of the falsehood or reckless disregard in relation to it, 
was required. This requirement was in subsequent decisions then extended 
to defamation suits involving plaintiffs who were public figures.112 For a 
short time, the “actual malice” requirement was extended even further to 
apply in all matters of “public interest” before “[t]he law then retreated 
to a dichotomy between defamation on matters of public concern in 
which the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, and defamation on 
106. Ibid at 790.
107. Ibid at 787.
108. For Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 382, Prosser’s “efforts at creative taxonomy…in a real sense 
‘invented’ the false light tort by singling out previously unacknowledged features common to most of 
the nonadvertising [sic] appropriation cases.”
109. James B Lake, “Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits on a 
Troublesome Tort” (2009) 61:3 Fed Comm LJ 625 at 637.
110. Sullivan, supra note 99.
111. Smolla, supra note 100.
112. Curtis Publishing Co v Butts, 388 US 130 (1967); Associated Press v Walker, 389 US 889 
(1967).
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matters of public concern in which the plaintiff is a private figure.”113 For 
plaintiffs falling into the latter category, the required level of fault must be 
at least negligence but varies depending on the state in which the action 
was initiated.114 The decision in Gertz in 1974 also limited the recovery 
of presumed or punitive damages to claims that had satisfied the “actual 
malice” fault requirement.115 On top of these restrictions, the Supreme 
Court established a further line of constitutional limitations impeding the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover.116
The cumulative impact of these changes was to significantly narrow 
the opportunities for plaintiffs seeking damages for defamation. False 
light was therefore often used as an alternative or supplementary means of 
legal redress for plaintiffs suffering reputational damage from defamatory 
expression.117 Nonetheless, the limits of the tort were quickly established 
through two important decisions by the US Supreme Court. 
In Time, Inc v Hill,118 the Supreme Court considered an action for 
invasion of privacy based on New York’s privacy statute. The reliance 
on the statute meant that the action was technically for commercial 
appropriation.119 Nonetheless, the facts of the case were a close fit for a 
false light action as at the root of the action was a claim based on a non-
defamatory falsehood. In September 1952, the Hill family had been held 
hostage for nineteen hours by three convicts on the run.120 The story later 
inspired a novel loosely based on the events in which the hostage-takers 
behave menacingly and at times violently toward their hostages, contrary 
to their actual behaviour.121 The novel was itself turned into a Broadway 
play the following year, and Life magazine published a photo essay on 
113. Smolla, supra note 100.
114. Gertz, supra note 76 at 345-346.
115. Ibid at 349.
116. Amongst other factors, actual malice must be demonstrated with “convincing clarity” while 
appellate courts have been entitled to engage in “independent review” in relation to First Amendment 
cases. There has been increased use of summary review limiting severely the number of libel cases 
which go to a jury and the characterization of plaintiffs as public officials and public figures has been 
very liberally applied. See David A Anderson, “Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?” (1991) 140:2 U Pa L 
Rev 487 at 494-501.
117. See Section V, below.
118. 385 US 374 (1967) [Time].
119. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 384.
120. Alex Alben, “Privacy and the Press—An Examination of how the Supreme Court Confused 
Press Freedom and False Light Privacy in Critical Cases” (2017) 28 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 13 at 3.
121. According to the Hills, the hostage-takers behaved civilly throughout, and the detention 
ended without further incident when the convicts left the home, although two of the hostage-takers 
subsequently were killed in the police’s attempt to apprehend them. See Don R Pember & Dwight L 
Teeter, Jr., “Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill” (1974) 50:1 Wash L Rev 57 at 63.
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it.122 Unlike the novel and the play,123 Life’s article named the family as 
the subject, falsely attributed the more sensationalist elements of the novel 
and play to the Hills’ actual experience, and printed photographs of the 
actors recreating scenes from the play at the Hills’ former home. 
Mr. Hill had originally won damages of $30,000, but the Supreme 
Court found narrowly in favour of Time, Inc, remanding the case for a 
new trial. The majority of the Court held that the constitutional protections 
for speech and press meant that false reports were protected from liability 
unless the plaintiff could prove either that the defendant knew the report 
was false or was reckless in his or her disregard of the truth.124 Although 
the Supreme Court judgment never mentioned “false light” and instead 
referred to the “doctrine of fictionalization,”125 the Time decision made 
clear that the constitutional protections established against defamation 
actions in Sullivan were applicable in privacy actions.126 
The only other time the US Supreme Court has considered false light 
was in Cantrell v Forest City Publishing Co in 1974.127 The action was 
brought by Mrs. Cantrell and her children following two stories about her 
in a Cleveland newspaper. Mrs. Cantrell’s husband had been among the 
forty-four victims killed when a bridge collapsed.128 After publishing a 
first story on the consequences of the tragedy on the Cantrell family, the 
journalist returned to the family for a follow-up without the knowledge 
or consent of Mrs. Cantrell.129 The second article implied that the widow 
had been present during the interview and portrayed the family as living in 
poverty within a “dirty and dilapidated” home.130 The Cantrells had won at 
trial although their claim for punitive damages was rejected by the district 
judge on the basis that there had been no evidence of the common law 
standard of malice.131 The verdict was overturned by US Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, which appeared to have considered that the required 
standard of fault from Time (ie knowledge of falsity or recklessness in 
disregard for the truth) had not been met and that there was no evidence 
of knowledge on the part of the defendant.132 When the Supreme Court 
122. Ibid.
123. Bryan R Lasswell, “In Defense of False Light: Why False Light Must Remain a Viable Cause of 
Action” (1993) 34:1 S Tex L Rev 149 at 155-156.
124. Time, supra note 118 at 387-388.
125. Ibid at 385, n 9.
126. McKenna, supra note 41 at 132.
127. 419 US 245 (1974) [Cantrell].
128. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 388.
129. Lasswell, supra note 123 at 156.
130. Cantrell, supra note 127 at 248.
131. Ibid at 251-252.
132. Ibid.
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considered the appeal, it found that the district judge’s instructions to the 
jury adequately communicated that knowledge or recklessness on the part 
of the defendant was necessary for a verdict for the plaintiff.133 In addition, 
the majority held that there was ample evidence at trial to suggest the 
journalist knew of the falsehoods contained within the publication and 
that the defendant was liable as his employer.134 The Court, however, was 
unwilling to comment on whether a lower standard of fault would be 
constitutional. 
Together, the decisions in Time and Cantrell appeared to have 
simultaneously confirmed the valid existence of the false light tort and 
established some limitations on it. For Zimmerman, however, the Supreme 
Court had given the false light action “a generous reception.”135 The tort 
indeed appeared to have been readily accommodated across different 
jurisdictions in the US. Reported false light actions began to multiply with 
Kelso recording in 1992 that there had been over 350 cases at the state 
level and more than 250 federal cases since Prosser’s article in 1960.136 
In a number of states (New York, Virginia, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Rhode 
Island), privacy statutes occupied the field and prevented the recognition 
of additional privacy torts,137 but where this was not the case, the false 
light tort appeared to gain general recognition. Whether this was due to 
courts recognizing a compelling case for the tort or due instead to Prosser’s 
unique position of influence to mould American tort law according to his 
design is a moot point.138 As critics of the action have shown, in many 
US jurisdictions, courts simply grounded the existence of the tort in its 
inclusion in the Restatement without extensive analysis of its advantages 
and disadvantages.139 Moreover, it was apparent that false light’s rise was 
133. Ibid at 252.
134. Ibid at 253-254.
135. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 392. Zimmerman is critical of the Supreme Court’s judgment for 
not subjecting the false light action to a more extensive and rigorous examination of the state’s interest 
in limiting free speech (ibid at 385).
136. Kelso, supra note 43 at 783.
137. Privacy actions in New York have to be based on Section 51 of the NY Civil Rights Law. See 
Howell v New York Post Co, Inc, 612 NE (2d) 699 at 703 (NY Ap Ct 1993). Similarly, Virginian 
courts have rejected the availability of remedy for invasion of privacy outside the available statutory 
protection in the state: see WJLA-TV v Levin, 564 SE (2d) 383 at 395, n 5 (Va Sup Ct 2002). For 
Wisconsin, see Zinda	 v	 Louisiana	Pacific	Corp, 440 NW 2d 548 at 555 (Wis Sup Ct 1989). The 
privacy statutes of Nebraska (Nebraska Revised Statute § 20-204 (1979)) and Rhode Island (Rhode 
Island General Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(4) (2009)) explicitly recognize false light as a cause of action. 
138. Neil M Richards and Daniel J Solove point out that Prosser’s position as “a well-regarded torts 
scholar…[,] the leading treatise writer and casebook author…[and] chief reporter for the Second 
Restatement of Torts” allowed unique influence over subsequent privacy jurisprudence” (“Prosser’s 
Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy” (2010) Cal  L Rev 1887 at 1890).
139. See Harvey L Zuckman, “Invasion of Privacy—Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has 
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David A Elder claimed that by 1991 “[t]he great majority of jurisdictions 
have found no difficulty with the false light tort under state law.”141 
However, resistance to the tort had already been evident for some time. 
Legal scholars increasingly called for a reformulation or abolition of the 
tort while there were also indications of judicial reconsideration of the 
tort’s value.
In addition to scrutiny of the origins of false light, criticisms from legal 
scholars have focused on a number of problems: the indistinct interests 
protected by the tort,142 the overlap with other forms of action and the 
associated argument that false light has been used to evade defamation’s 
procedural restrictions,143 the chilling effect it has on free speech,144 the 
vagueness of the highly offensive standard,145 and even the difficulty in 
distinguishing between truth and falsehoods.146 Later sections of this 
paper will explore further the first three of these critiques, but for now, it is 
sufficient to note that the academic re-assessment of the tort found an echo 
in some state courts.
In 1984, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the false light 
tort on both practical and constitutional grounds.147 In Renwick, a college 
dean previously involved in student admissions of African-American 
students sued for false light and libel following the publication of an 
article which, he alleged, attributed false statements to him, depicting him 
as “an extremist, a liar and…irresponsible in his position.”148 The Court, 
however, refused to recognize the false light tort due to its overlap with 
defamation and its negative impact on constitutionally protected free 
speech. Moreover, the Court speculatively asserted that the problems of a 
Gone” (1990) 47:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 253 at 255; Kelso, supra note 43 at 825.
140. Prosser, supra note 16 at 398.
141. Elder, supra note 70 at 264.
142. McKenna, supra note 41 at 116-119; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 371, 432.
143. McKenna, supra note 41 at 130; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 394; Kelso, supra note 43 at 846; 
Zuckman, supra note 139 at 258.
144. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 435; Zuckman, supra note 139 at 257.
145. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 374, 434.
146. Ibid at 406.
147. Renwick v News and Observer Publishing Co, 312 SE (2d) 405 at 412 (NC Sup Ct 1984) 
[Renwick].
148. Ibid at 409.
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prying, intrusive media identified by Warren and Brandeis were in the past 
due to higher standards of journalistic training.149 
The Renwick judgment seemed to inspire courts elsewhere to look 
more critically at the false light tort. Some courts, like the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Elm Medical Laboratory, Inc v RKO General, 
Inc, swiftly dispensed with implausible claims without definitively ruling 
out recognition in due course.150 Of more significance, however, were the 
decisions of the Supreme Courts of Texas and Minnesota in Cain v Hearst151 
and Wal-Mart152 respectively. Each court weighed the advantages and 
disadvantages of false light and rejected its adoption within their respective 
states. In both cases, the majority agreed with the Renwick judgment 
that the action largely duplicated existing torts, notably defamation, and 
infringed on constitutionally protected free speech.153 Duplication and free 
speech concerns were woven together to provide a catch-all justification 
for rejection of the tort. If false light failed to add any additional protection, 
then there was little reason for its existence. If, however, false light did add 
significantly to the protection against publicized falsehoods afforded to 
individuals, then it constituted an unacceptable threat to free speech.154 
The backlash against false light in the courts has not, however, 
been ineluctable. Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Courts of 
Colorado155 and Florida156 have rejected the tort, but false light has also 
been expressly approved by courts in Tennessee,157 Ohio,158 Missouri,159 
and Nevada.160 Where earlier adoption of the tort by state courts was often 
accomplished by rote reference to the Restatement, it is notable that the last 
four decisions engaged with the issues raised by other courts and academic 
commentary and have still found sufficient grounds to adopt the action. 
Nonetheless, the history of the tort in the US highlights its mixed judicial 
reception and its problematic relationship to the specific development of 
American defamation law. To assess the case for the tort’s importation into 
Canada, the following sections address the three most potent criticisms 
149. Ibid at 413.
150. In the words of Justice Nolan, “[t]his court has not recognized that tort and does not choose to do 
so now.” See 532 NE (2d) 675 at 681 (1989).
151. 878 SW 2d 577 (Tex Sup Ct 1994) [Cain].
152. Wal-Mart, supra note 40.
153. Ibid at 235-236; Cain, supra note 151 at 580-583.
154. Cain, supra note 151 at 583. 
155. Bueno, supra note 20.
156. Rapp, supra note 20.
157. West, supra note 20 at 645-646.
158. Welling v Weinfeld, 866 NE (2d) 1051 at 1057 (Ohio Sup Ct 2007) [Welling].
159. Meyerkord v Zipatoni Co, 276 SW (3d) 319 at 324 (Mo App ED 2008) [Meyerkord].
160. Franchise Tax Bd. of California v Hyatt, 335 P (3d) 125 at 141 (Nev Sup Ct 2014) [Franchise].
624 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of the tort: the uncertain interests protected by the tort, its independent 
viability as a cause of action, and its relationship to freedom of speech. 
IV. False light as privacy tort? The interests protected
Part of the confusion surrounding false light lies in Prosser’s problematic 
original formulation, which identified the interest protected as being 
“clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as 
in defamation.”161 Prosser also suggested it often operated as a functional 
equivalent to defamation “affording a needed remedy in a good many 
instances not covered by the other tort”162 and contemplated the prospect 
of false light “swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public 
defamation.”163 From the outset, then, the tort’s independence was in 
question due to the failure to locate its purpose in protecting a distinct 
privacy interest.164 According to Nathan E Ray, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Time reinforced the conflation of false light and defamation.165 
The Court grafted the constitutional restrictions for defamation onto false 
light without exploring whether the same interest was protected by both 
actions. Prosser’s focus on reputation has provided ammunition for critics 
who contend that false light is unnecessary due to its considerable overlap 
with defamation. Moreover, the identification of reputation as the key 
interest protected has led some to question whether the tort is properly 
grouped with the other privacy actions.166 
US courts have been divided, sometimes internally, about whether 
false light protects reputation or the right to be let alone. The majority 
judgments in Renwick167 and in Cain168 did not explicitly state that the 
interest protected by false light was reputation, but the action’s overlap 
with defamation was a dominant theme of both decisions. By contrast, 
the dissents in both cases characterized the interest protected as a privacy 
interest.169 Disagreement on this point has continued to characterize 
161. Prosser, supra note 16 at 400. It is a curious feature of Prosser’s conceptualization of the four 
privacy torts that he only identifies one, intrusion upon seclusion, with the protection of mental 
tranquility. Arguably, this interest inheres in all four actions and provides a clear rationale for grouping 
them together.  
162. Ibid at 401.
163. Ibid.
164. See Suzanne Reynolds Greenwood, “Privacy: The Search for a Standard” (1975) 11:4 Wake 
Forest L Rev 659 at 668-670 for a similar critique.
165. Nathan E Ray, “Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important 
Tort” (2000) 84:3 Minn L Rev 713 at 727.
166. Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995) 
at 156, 195.
167. Renwick, supra note 147.
168. Cain, supra note 151.
169. Renwick, supra note 147 at 415; Cain, supra note 151 at 586.
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the subsequent case law. Courts in Tennessee,170 Ohio,171 Missouri,172 
Nevada,173 and Hawai’i174 have all recognized that false light safeguards 
a privacy interest whereas courts in Colorado175 and Florida176 have found 
that such judgments depend on “parsing a too subtle distinction between 
an individual’s personal sensibilities and his or her reputation in the 
community.”177
Aside from its perceived proximity to defamation, Bruce A McKenna 
suggests a further, more philosophical, reason to doubt false light’s status 
as a privacy action. He argues that by its very nature a false statement 
about an individual cannot be something he or she wanted to keep private: 
[T]he person referred to in the statement cannot intend to keep private a 
matter which, in her own mind, does not exist. If the statement is false, 
then the person about whom it is made would have no reason to be aware 
of its subject matter. It must be questioned, therefore, how that individual 
can desire to keep the subject matter of the publication a private matter.178 
In a similar vein, Jonathan Schonsheck argues that false light is a sui generis 
tort, rather than a privacy one, as it does not necessarily involve an invasion 
of privacy and is more damaging to the victim’s “social persona.”179 For 
Schonsheck, attempts to find logical similarity between false light and the 
three other privacy torts become “contorted, strained, even paradoxical.”180 
These arguments are not especially convincing. An individual may desire 
to keep their private affairs hidden from public view: any publicity given 
to these affairs, even if false, is still an affront to the individual’s dignity. 
In addition, the person affected by a false representation of their private 
affairs may think it necessary to correct the public record, thus requiring 
him or her to make an unwanted public statement. In this way, it could 
be argued that the individual’s interest in privacy has been compromised 
twice. 
170. West, supra note 20 at 645-646.
171. Welling, supra note 158 at 1057. 
172. Meyerkord, supra note 159 at 324.
173. Franchise, supra note 160 at 141.
174. Chung v McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co, Ltd, 128 P (3d) 833 at 848 (Hawai‘i Sup Ct 2006).
175. Bueno, supra note 20 at 902.
176. Rapp, supra note 20 at 1109.
177. Bueno, supra note 20 at 902.
178. McKenna, supra note 41 at 126.
179. “The Unrelenting Darkness of False Light: A Sui Generis Tort” in Ann E Cudd & Mark C 
Navin, eds, Core Concepts and Contemporary Issues in Privacy, AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Law and Justice, vol 8 (Cham: Springer, 2018) at 97. 
180. Ibid at 103.
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Rather than define false light by its protection of reputation, it seems 
more appropriate to ground false light in the protection it accords individual 
privacy.181 While defamation concerns an objective, external reputational 
interest, “[i]n privacy cases the interest affected is the subjective one of 
injury to [the] inner person.”182 How this is more precisely delineated, 
however, has been the subject of considerable academic contention. Ken 
Gormley suggests four definitional clusters emerging from the literature: 
(1) privacy as “an expression of one’s personality or personhood, focussing 
upon the right of the individual to define his or her essence as a human 
being”; (2) privacy as an issue of autonomy, “the moral freedom of the 
individual to engage in his or her own thoughts, actions and decisions”; 
(3) privacy as the control of information about oneself; and (4) “mix and 
match” definitions that conceptualize privacy as in terms of multiple key 
elements.183 Gormley’s catholic approach, finding value in each of these 
competing definitions, is adopted here as it provides a broad analytical 
framework capturing the key conceptual dimensions of privacy.184 
The four definitional clusters outlined by Gormley suggest a clear 
basis for justifying the false light action by its protection of privacy 
interests. While the third approach—the right to determine whether, how 
much, when and with whom personal information is shared with others—
is most obviously engaged by false light claims, the first two definitions 
also have some relevance. An individual’s right to express their personality 
is arguably infringed by widely disseminated falsehoods. The disjuncture 
between their self-expression and others’ characterization of them 
will likely diminish their reputation externally, but the publicly known 
falsehoods may also cause an internal injury if it limits or distorts their 
capacity for self-expression. The right to autonomy is also circumscribed 
by publicized false claims as it constrains the freedom to think, act and 
make decisions: the subject of a publicized falsity is forced into a decision 
about whether and how to respond.185 
Determining the interest protected by false light as the right to privacy 
provides the tort with a stronger foundation. Not only does this help dispel 
concerns that the action overlaps too extensively with defamation, it also 
provides a stronger justification for recovery in non-defamatory false 
181. Lasswell, supra note 123 at 170; McKenna, supra note 41 at 127.
182. Thomas I Emerson, “The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press” (1979) 14:2 Harv CR-CLL 
Rev 329 at 333.
183. Ken Gormley, “One Hundred Years of Privacy” [1992] Wis L Rev 1335 at 1337-1338.
184. Ibid at 1339.
185. Greenwood, supra note 164 at 688.
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light cases based on incorrect laudatory statements about a plaintiff.186 If 
false light protects reputation, then recovery for reputational damage in 
such cases could only be rationalized when the falseness of the laudatory 
statement was already known. Where the falsity of the representation of the 
plaintiff was not widely known, then it is impossible to claim reputational 
damage. Obviously, the false light claim would itself expose incorrect 
positive statements about the plaintiff, but basing a claim for reputational 
damage on the damage incurred by the claim being made hardly seems 
like sound logic. A more coherent approach recognizes that the injuries 
sustained are first and foremost internal, as violations of privacy rights.
V. False light as a viable independent cause of action?
According to its critics, a major problem with the false light tort is that it 
adds little to existing common law remedies. Its superfluous nature, it is 
alleged, can be seen in the significant amount of overlap with other causes 
of action, evident in the fact that false light rarely stands as an independent 
cause of action and that recovery for false light alone is even rarer. This 
section examines these arguments and, by outlining contrasting categories 
of false light cases, highlights the differences between a broad conception 
of false light, featuring significant intersection with other tort actions, 
and a narrower conception emphasizing false light’s discrete nature. The 
latter, it will be argued, is most suitable if the tort were to be imported into 
Canada.
Section II highlighted that false light shares important elements and 
defences with defamation while the interests protected by the tort have 
sometimes been identified as reputational as shown in section III. Given 
this fundamental similarity, it is not surprising that in practice false light 
and defamation actions have often been combined where allowed.187 
Such overlap can be criticized for judicial inefficiency, but perhaps more 
problematic is the use of false light, a tort “relatively unencumbered by 
common law restrictions,”188 to circumvent the strict limitations placed 
on defamation actions. Where a defamation action is barred by the statute 
of limitations, false light may provide an alternative means of relief.189 
186. See West, supra note 20 at 646.
187. Courts have often adopted a critical attitude towards plaintiffs’ attempts to initiate defamation 
and false light claims together. For instance, in California, the plaintiff, if initiating actions for both 
defamation and false light, must include a claim for a non-defamatory statement; if it does not, the 
false light claim is subsumed into the defamation action. See Dworkin v Hustler Magazine Inc, 867 F 
(2d) 1188 at 1193 (9th Cir 1989).
188. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 394; See also Lake, supra note 109 at 638.
189. For instance, the Court in Rinsley v Brandt, 446 F Supp 850 at 858 (D Kan 1977) rejected 
adopting the one year limit on defamation actions due to the separate nature of the false light tort. 
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Defamation defences have also not always been consistently applied 
to false light actions by courts.190 For some authors, this is particularly 
concerning given the potential chilling effect of any action imposing 
liability for expression.191 Both Elder and Wade make the case that the use 
of false light to evade the stringent restrictions on defamation is a positive 
feature of the tort,192 but proponents of this view are in the minority and 
their opinion is not shared by most courts.193
Kelso’s exhaustive review of false light case law since Prosser’s 
article (ie 1960–1992) indicates that the category of false light claims 
where defamation was also pleaded is the single largest class of false light 
cases.194 The relatively small subset of such cases in which the plaintiff 
was awarded damages or where an appellate court allowed the case to 
advance to trial do not prove false light’s independent existence as “the 
false light claim in each case added absolutely nothing to the plaintiff’s 
recovery.”195 False light was also judged to not augment plaintiffs’ claims 
when paired with appropriation and/or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.196 The final stage of Kelso’s study examines cases in which 
a false light claim standing alone was the basis for recovery or for the 
trial proceeding. Cases within this very small subset of false light claims 
are more accurately characterized, according to Kelso, as defamation or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims or a combination of 
both. Kelso’s study, therefore, raises strong doubts about the independent 
viability and value of false light.
An alternative way to explore this issue is to look at different attempts 
to group together false light claims. Based on a thorough examination of 
existing US case law, Elder identifies nine types of false light actions. 
False light claims have been made based on publicity containing alleged 
falsehoods which:
1. implicitly or explicitly portray the plaintiff as implicated in, 
suspected of, and/or linked to criminal conduct197;
190. Lake, supra note 109 at 626.
191. See Section V, below.
192. Elder, supra note at 70 at 263; John W Wade, “Defamation and the Right of Privacy” (1962) 15:4 
Vand L Rev 1093 at 1120-1122.
193. For instance, most courts have imposed the defamation limitations period on false light claims. 
See Kelso, supra note 43 at 858.
194. Ibid at 835.
195. Ibid at 838-839.
196. Ibid at 851, 855.
197. Elder, supra note 70 at 285.
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2. portray the plaintiff as taking part in sexually promiscuous 
conduct or conduct otherwise perceived as immoral198;
3. include a picture of, or story about, the plaintiff in a 
pornographic or other scurrilous publication199;
4. impute or imply behaviour which, though “unethical, 
dishonest, disreputable or exceptionally unseemly,” falls short 
of criminal 200;
5. create a negative impression about the plaintiff with respect to 
his or her profession, office or business201;
6. inaccurately represent the plaintiff’s financial condition, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff was a business-person or 
merchant202;
7. depict the plaintiff, who has been the victim of a crime or 
is in some other way worthy of sympathy, as pathetic or 
ridiculous203;
8. misuse the plaintiff’s name in a non-commercial context, 
imputing to him or her false beliefs, legal or political affiliation 
or involvement, or status as a litigant, critic or candidate204; or
9. use the plaintiff’s name or picture in some form of advertising 
for the defendant’s business or product.205
These nine illustrative categories covering the “spectrum of exposures of 
the public self”206 give a strong indication of both the breadth of previous 
false light claims and the substantial overlap with other tort actions. Many 
of these categories (for instance, 1, 2, 4 and 5) could potentially give rise to 
a defamation action in addition to, or in place of, a false light claim, while 
the final two types of action seem closer to the appropriation privacy tort. 
In addition, a plaintiff in one of these nine scenarios may also be able to 
make a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress depending on 
the gravity of the distress suffered, the defendant’s behaviour amounting 
to “extreme and outrageous conduct,”207 and the jurisdiction. 
In contrast to Elder’s categorization, Schwartz’s classification is not so 
much an attempt to gather previous false light claims into coherent groups 
198. Ibid at 286.
199. Ibid at 287.
200. Ibid at 291.
201. Ibid at 292.
202. Ibid at 293.
203. Ibid at 294.
204. Ibid at 295.
205. Ibid at 296.
206. Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy” (1977) 12:2 Harv CR-CLL Rev 233 at 256.
207. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 46.
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as to locate the discrete essence of false light. He argues that false light 
should be limited to publicizing non-disparaging falsehoods about the 
plaintiff208 and suggests four non-exhaustive categories in which false light 
properly applies: (1) where the defendant publicizes false non-defamatory 
claims about the plaintiff’s private life209; (2) where the defendant makes 
false claims about the “deeply personal thoughts or emotions of the 
plaintiff”210; (3) where the defendant depicts the plaintiff as “severely 
victimized by a variety of circumstances”211; and (4) where the defendant 
makes false laudatory claims about the plaintiff.212 Both the Cantrell and 
Time decisions fall within the third category and Cantrell can also be 
situated in the second group. A case such as Eastwood v Superior Court,213 
in which Clint Eastwood sued for false light based on publicized false 
accounts of his romantic entanglements, provides an example of the first. 
As the alleged relationship depicted did not involve infidelity by either 
party, it would be difficult to establish reputational damage, but clearly 
there is an invasion of privacy. An example of the final category would be 
an unauthorized biography that makes false laudatory claims of its subject 
such as in Spahn v Julian Messner, Inc.214 
Canadian courts considering adopting the false light tort would face 
the choice between the broad version of the tort with hazy definitional 
boundaries and substantial overlap with other claims and a minimal version 
that provides a cause of action for scenarios not covered by defamation. 
As a novel cause of action, it is easier to justify the latter. To adopt the 
Restatement’s definition of false light would mean accepting a more 
vaguely defined tort characterized by considerable overlap with existing 
causes of action. A clear risk entailed in this option would be duplication 
resulting in judicial inefficiency. The evidence from Kelso’s study 
indicates that the vast bulk of false light actions, at least until 1992, could 
have been framed as another cause of action. A narrower false light tort 
avoids this replication while still providing recovery for situations where 
the publicity given to a non-disparaging falsehood constitutes a significant 
invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy. Undoubtedly, a major reason for the 
proliferation of false light claims in the US context has been the tightening 
of defamation rules.215 As defamation remains a viable option for plaintiffs 
208. Schwartz, supra note 15 at 892.
209. Ibid at 893.
210. Ibid at 894.
211. Ibid at 895.
212. Ibid.
213. 149 Cal App (3d) 409 (Cal Ct App 1983).
214. 233 NE (2d) 840 (NY Ct App 1967).
215. Lake, supra note 109 at 638.
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in Canada, there is less functional need to provide an alternative method of 
legal recourse. For these reasons, then, a narrow version of the false light 
tort is preferable.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this narrow version of false 
light services an actual need in society and whether the privacy interests 
violated are sufficiently serious to warrant extension of the common 
law. The narrow definition of false light grounded in the right to privacy 
suggested here helps minimize the overlap with other causes of action and 
as such, establishes a stronger claim for its distinctiveness. What it does 
not establish is that the privacy interests involved are suitably widespread 
to warrant legal recognition. The limited evidence of distinct false light 
cases identified in Kelso’s study does not substantiate a need for this novel 
cause of action. Furthermore, the nature of the privacy interest infringed 
may itself not be worthy of protection. A recurrent concern even mentioned 
by Prosser is that the tort may encourage the initiation of trivial claims.216 
The “highly offensive to a reasonable person” standard may help to limit 
frivolous claims succeeding, but if applied strictly would work to shrink 
further the number of viable false light actions. 
VI.	False	light	and	free	speech:	A	chilling	effect?
This section assesses the extent to which false light potentially impinges 
on free speech through an exploration of the contrasting approaches to free 
speech in the American and Canadian contexts and the specific mechanism 
by which false light could have a chilling effect. Although the adoption 
of false light in Canada would probably not give rise to the same level of 
concern, the chilling argument cannot be entirely disregarded, particularly 
for media organizations. 
As shown earlier, changes in American defamation law in the 1960s 
and 1970s significantly restricted the ability of plaintiffs to recover. Despite 
this, David A Anderson argues that the “remnants of American libel law” 
still have a chilling effect due to the interaction of a constitutionally 
permissive regime encouraging publishers to libel, the small but extant 
possibility of a large jury award incentivising plaintiffs, and costly and 
protracted litigation.217 However, from a comparative perspective, US 
legal protection of free speech is extremely strong.218 At least some of 
the free speech anxiety expressed in academic and judicial commentary 
about false light seems attributable to this very particular framework. For 
instance, Zimmerman’s contention that false light has “a severe chilling 
216. Prosser, supra note 16 at 401.
217. Anderson, supra note 116 at 487, 550.
218. See eg Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at para 85 [Grant].
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effect on the communication of accurate information”219 is perhaps only 
comprehensible in the US context. 
The purported chilling effect of false light would likely be less of a 
concern if the tort was imported into Canadian jurisdictions. A repeated 
theme of Canadian jurisprudence has been that individual rights are not 
absolute and this is equally true of freedom of speech.220 Freedom of 
expression is protected in Canada by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, but this right is qualified by section 1 of the 
Charter, which allows that Charter rights can be subject to “reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”221 While the Charter does not apply directly to the 
common law when the dispute is between two non-governmental actors,222 
the Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that the common law has to be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Charter principles.223 Accordingly, 
in recent years the common law of defamation has been modified to allow 
greater protection for freedom of expression on public interest issues. 
The Supreme Court, in Grant, recognized a new defence of “responsible 
communication on matters of public interest” in defamation actions224 
while in WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, the Court expanded the availability 
of the fair comment defence by clarifying that the defence was to be 
assessed according to an objective standard, that is whether on the proven 
facts anyone could honestly have expressed the defamatory comment.225 
However, despite the expanded defences available to defendants, the law 
of defamation is still much more plaintiff-friendly in Canada than in the 
US.226
The difference between the approaches to free speech in the American 
and Canadian contexts can be seen in the contrasting attitudes towards 
balancing freedom of expression against other concerns. In the Canadian 
context, this is a recurrent feature of Supreme Court of Canada judgments 
which have “recognized that the values of individual reputation, emotional 
security and privacy protected by civil responsibility for libel should be 
219. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 370.
220. See eg Grant, supra note 218 at para 2.
221. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
222. RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174.
223. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 91, 126 DLR (4th) 129 
[Hill].
224. Grant, supra note 218 at para 7.
225. 2008 SCC 40 at paras 49-51 [WIC Radio].
226. Mitchell Drucker, “Canadian v. American Defamation Law: What Can We Learn from 
Hyperlinks” (2013) 38 Can-USLJ 141 at 142, 150; Adrienne Stone, “Defamation of Public Figures: 
North American Contrasts” (2005) 50:1 NYL Sch L Rev 9.
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given equal weight with the values of democratic self-governance and 
truth finding that are protected by freedom of expression.”227 By contrast, 
similar balancing exercises undertaken in the past by the US Supreme 
Court have been much more controversial for, among other things, not 
giving meaningful content to the First Amendment.228 
The different approach to free speech issues in the two 
countries suggests that, were the false light tort to be adopted in 
Canada, anxiety about its chilling effect would likely be less 
pronounced. Where such concerns were raised by defendants, 
courts could fall back on a balancing exercise weighing the quasi-
constitutional privacy interest229 of the plaintiff with the defendant’s 
right to free expression. In other words, the tension between the two 
rights at stake in a false light case would not in itself be a reason to 
reject the tort’s adoption. 
The chilling effect argument, though, cannot be rejected 
entirely. One objection against false light is that it would encourage 
much greater conservatism on the part of media organizations as 
from an editorial standpoint, false non-defamatory statements are 
difficult to identify.230 News stories that injure the reputation of the 
plaintiff can be easily recognized prior to publication and their claims 
subjected to close scrutiny. Reporting that presents its subjects in 
a neutral or positive manner does not raise such concerns and so 
liability for false light claims can be avoided only by “laboriously 
checking the accuracy of all statements of fact about individuals 
presented by the reporters and researchers.”231 Such a development 
would strain the capacity of many media organizations, particularly 
at a point when journalism is acknowledged by many to be in 
crisis.232 Recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions have pointed 
227. Peter A Downard, The Law of Libel in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) at 26-27. For 
examples of this, see Hill, supra note 223 at para 107; WIC Radio, supra note 225 at para 2; Grant, 
supra note 218 at para 46.
228. Thomas I Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1962) 72:5 Yale LJ 
877 at 913-914; Laurent B Frantz, “The First Amendment in the Balance” (1962) 71:8 Yale LJ 1424 at 
1443.
229. Lavigne	v	Canada	(Office	of	the	Commissioner	of	Official	Languages), 2002 SCC 53 at paras 
24-25 [Lavigne].
230. Zuckman, supra note 139 at 257.
231. Ibid [emphasis in original].
232. Victor Pickard, “Can Government Support the Press? Historicizing and Internationalizing a 
Policy Approach to the Journalism Crisis” (2011) 14:2 Communication Rev 73.
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to the fundamental role of freedom of expression233 and the integral 
role played by the communications media in Canadian democracy.234 
While this freedom must be balanced against the quasi-constitutional 
right to privacy recognized in Lavigne,235 the chilling risk posed 
by false light may be too great, particularly given the concerns 
identified earlier that the specific privacy interest being protected is 
neither sufficiently widespread nor serious enough to warrant legal 
protection. 
Conclusion
The false light tort has not been extinguished in the US despite a growing 
movement against it in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the turn of the century, 
state courts have continued to adopt the tort and Prosser’s privacy tort 
framework remains the primary point of reference for American discussion 
of privacy protection under the common law. The decisions in Jones and 
Doe signalled a new openness to Prosser’s privacy torts on the part of 
Ontario courts with the recognition of false light in Yenovkian a further 
step in this direction. However, before other Canadian common law 
courts embrace false light, they should consider whether the tort is truly 
necessary in the Canadian context. The history and development of the tort 
in the US highlight uncertainty over the interests false light protects and 
concern about its impact on free speech. The action’s substantial overlap 
with defamation is also important: the growth of false light claims is 
clearly connected to the specific American context, that is the increasingly 
restrictive parameters of defamation law in the US. These criticisms 
can be blunted by reframing the tort to protect privacy interests, not 
reputation, and by permitting relief only where the publicly communicated 
information about the plaintiff is non-defamatory. The regular use of false 
light in conjunction with, or in place of, defamation and appropriation 
actions can be avoided by establishing a more coherent version of the tort 
that provides protection only in scenarios unlikely to be covered by other 
causes of action. 
Yet, it remains uncertain, even in a world of routine privacy 
infringements, whether there is a sufficient need for such an action. 
Genuine false light cases are relatively rare, and it is questionable whether 
the violation of privacy involved in such fact patterns rises to a level 
requiring legal remedy. Furthermore, recognizing potential liability for 
233. Grant, supra note 218 at paras 1, 42.
234. Ibid at para 52.
235. Lavigne, supra note 229 at paras 24-25.
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non-defamatory expression, though less likely to cause consternation in 
the Canadian context, may still unduly hamper the work of the media. 
Together, these factors strongly favour judicial conservatism and courts 
facing false light claims should reject. Novel torts should not be recognized 
too hastily as “[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, 
may prove unstable.”236
236. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Speaking In A Judicial Voice” (1992) 67:6 NYU L Rev 1185 at 1198.
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